In Matter for First Impression, Court Finds that Discovery Is Allowed In California Public Records Act Cases

City of L.A. v. Super. Ct., 3/2/17, 2DCA/7
The California Public Records Act (CPRA) was passed in 1968, two years after U.S. Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  The CPRA gives members of the public the right to request and access information in the possession of California’s public agencies. Here, the requesting party sought information from the LAPD about vehicle impounding practices, but the LAPD was not forthcoming.  The requesting party’s attorney, Donald Cook, has represented various parties seeking information from various law enforcement agencies in California on the same issue. The LAPD, like other police departments in other cities, argued that they didn’t own the information in question, which was held by “official police garages,” viz., private third party vendors. According to the LAPD, the information did not qualify as “public records” and therefore did not have to be disclosed under the CPRA. In such cases, the CPRA grants the requesting person the right to file a petition to the Superior Court to compel disclosure (which is a special proceeding, not a civil action), and Cook’s client did that.  Cook served various forms of discovery under the California’s discovery act to determine whether the LAPD’s claim of non-ownership was bona-fide.  The LAPD inserted one objection only (all eggs, one basket!!) – that there was no right to discovery in CPRA cases.  Cook filed a motion to compel.  The trial court found that discovery was allowed in special proceedings, granted the motion to compel and awarded over $5,000 in sanctions, finding there was no substantial justification for the LAPD’s refusal to provide responses.  Held: Affirmed as to finding that discovery is allowed in CPRA special proceedings; otherwise reversed.

A CPRA matter is by definition a “special proceeding,” and other courts have so held.  A special proceeding is a creature of statute that wasn’t recognized under the common law or equity practice. The discovery act expressly applies to “civil actions” and “special proceedings of a civil nature.”  Thus, discovery is allowed in CPRA matters.

The City’s arguments to the contrary were all very weak.  For example, the City argued that even though the CPRA was admittedly a special proceeding, discovery should not be allowed because the CPRA statutory scheme was silent on the issue of discovery. As the court noted, the big problem with that argument: “Our courts have repeatedly concluded, however, that the discovery act applies to statutorily-enacted special proceedings that are silent with respect to discovery.”  The court nevertheless reversed the sanctions award — The matter was one of first impression, and the underlying issue – whether and how much discovery a governmental agency might have to endure in CPRA cases — presents a very important question for public agencies.  

2DCA gave the the City a huge break.  It even ordered the trial court to allow the LAPD to assert additional objections to the discovery, and to further weigh whether the discovery should be allowed under an assortment of factors listed in the opinion. Usually the failure to assert objections means they are waived!!

Tolling of the 1-Year Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice Ends When Client Reasonably Should Have No Expectation That Attorney Will Provide Further Legal Services

Flake v. Neumiller & Beardslee, 1/31/17 CA3

This case concerns allegations of legal malpractice.  With certain tolling exceptions, legal malpractice cases must be filed within one year of when the client discovered or should have discovered the wrongful conduct. Code of Civ. Proc 340.6.  Flake sued his attorney, Neumiller, more than one year after the attorney had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, but less than one year after the court granted that motion.  Section 340.6 also provides that the statute of limitations is tolled while the attorney continues to represented the client.  While a motion to withdraw is pending, Attorneys must continue representing their clients to avoid prejudice.  Nonetheless, Neumiller filed a motion for summary judgment because a substitution of attorney form had been circulated and executed by all concerned; the new attorney had simply failed to file it with the trial court.  Moreover, the new attorney was already actively engaged in representing Flake in the matter, including handling the three then-pending post-trial motions.  The court granted attorney’s summary judgment.  Held: Affirmed.

The end of an attorney-client relationship is not always signaled by a bright line, and “the failure to formally withdraw as attorney of record, standing alone, will not toll the statute of limitations under the rubric of continued representation.”  Based on the undisputed facts, the court accepted Neumiller’s theory on appeal, namely that no reasonable client could objectively believe Neumiller was still providing legal services after receiving the motion to withdraw alleging that the case had been handed off to successor counsel.