Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept., 2/7/17 4DCA/3
This decision will help promote professionalism in Orange County litigation culture. Plaintiff sued defendant for employment discrimination. Later, Defendant filed for summary judgment and hearing was scheduled to take place after the trial date. Defendant asked the trial court to continue the trial in order to accommodate summary judgment hearing, and the court granted its request. Plaintiff timely set depositions in order to oppose the summary judgment, but defense counsel was unavailable because of trial. Recognizing the problem that this presented to plaintiff, defense counsel agreed to stipulate to continue the summary judgment and the trial date. The stipulation was filed 16 days before the hearing. The trial court refused to sign the stipulation for a lack diligence, and granted Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment. Held: Reversed.
There are two ways to continue the hearing on a motion for summary judgment: File a declaration under CCP 437c(h) at leaset 14 days before the hearing, or seek a continuance under the ordinary discretionary standard by making a showing of good cause. Getting a continuance under 437c(h) is liberally granted because of the phrasing of the statute. If plaintiff had submitted a 437c(h) request, the trial court would have been hard pressed to deny her request for more time. But Plaintiff filed a stipulation for a continuance of the summary judgment and the trial, and didn’t file a 437c(h) declaration.
The stipulation contained various recitals explaining the situation, and the fact the parties were having settlement discussions. The appellate court found that plaintiff had made a showing of good cause, and that the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to sign the stipulation. The court said: “While that stipulation was, of course, not binding on the court, principles of encouraging civility, encouraging the settlement discussions that were ongoing, and disposing of cases on their merits counseled in favor of accepting it, absent some good reason for rejecting it.” The court found that while the plaintiff cold have been more diligent, a “relatively minor lack of diligence did not justify the substantial injustice the court‘s order created.” The court also noted that the trial court had granted Sheriff’s request to continue the trial to make way for the summary judgment; and the disparate treatment of plaintiff’s counsel “tilted the scales of justice sharply in favor of the Sheriff.”
The court acknowledged that the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act establishes timelines within which to complete cases. But the policy of promoting judicial economy is outweighed by the policy of disposing of cases on their merits.